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Social Support Substitution and the Earnings Rebound: 
Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity  
in Disability Insurance Reform †
By Lex Borghans, Anne C. Gielen, and Erzo F. P. Luttmer *
We exploit a cohort discontinuity in the stringency of Dutch disability 
reforms to estimate the effects of decreased DI (disability insurance) 
generosity on behavior of existing recipients. We find evidence of 
social support substitution: individuals on average offset €1.00 of 
lost DI benefits by collecting €0.30 more from other social assistance 
programs, but this benefit-substitution effect declines over time.
Individuals also exhibit a rebound in earnings: earnings increase by €0.62 on average per euro of lost DI benefits and this effect remains 
roughly constant over time. This is strong evidence of substantial 
remaining earnings capacity among long-term claimants of DI.(JEL I38, J14, J22, J28, J31)
Because estimates of labor supply responses are of tremendous policy relevance,the literature on the effects of changes in the eligibility criteria or generos-
ity of social assistance programs1 has rightly focused on labor supply responses. 
These estimates, however, do not capture two additional policy-relevant dimensions
of the response to changes in social assistance programs. First, they miss poten-
tial  spillover effects to other social assistance programs that arise when individuals 
substitute between programs. Such social support substitution reduces the welfare 
impact of reductions in generosity of any given program on recipients of that pro-
gram. Moreover, social support substitution may decrease the reduced-form labor
1 We use the term social assistance generically to refer to any social insurance or income maintenance programs 
rather than to a specific program.
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supply response to changes in generosity of a particular program when individuals 
take up other programs instead of adjusting their labor supply. Evidence on the 
extent of social support substitution is also important for policymakers because it 
allows them to make more accurate predictions of the budgetary impact of a reform 
to a social assistance program by taking into account the spillover effects of the 
reform on participation in other programs. Second, existing estimates of supply 
responses typically do not distinguish between responses by existing claimants and 
responses by (potential) new enrollees. Evidence of labor supply responses among 
existing DI recipients is of importance for policy reforms because effects which 
operate on the existing stock of recipients have the potential to make a much greater 
immediate impact than effects which operate on the comparatively small inflow into 
a DI program.
The Dutch DI system, which also insures against partial loss of earnings  capacity, 
was significantly reformed in 1993. Two features make this reform particularly 
suitable for studying substitution between different social assistance programs as 
well as labor supply responses among current recipients. First, we have administra-
tive panel data on the universe of Dutch disability insurance claimants, including 
information on their future labor market earnings and their future income from all 
other government cash social assistance programs. These data allow us to track for 
a period of nearly a decade what happens to (former) disability insurance claimants 
in the wake of the reform. Second, the reform contains a cohort discontinuity: the 
reform was significantly more stringent and led to an average benefit reduction of an 
additional 10 percent for the cohort that turned 45 after August 1, 1993. Because we 
have each individual’s month of birth, we exploit this discontinuity by comparing 
later labor market earnings and social assistance income for the cohort just below 
this age cutoff to outcomes for the cohort just above the age cutoff. We scale this 
difference in outcomes by the discontinuity in disability benefit levels around the 
age cutoff. This yields two key ratios: (i) the benefit-substitution ratio, which is the 
average causal effect of the more stringent DI rules on income from other social 
assistance as a fraction of average lost DI income, and (ii) the earnings crowd-out 
ratio, which is the average causal effect of the more stringent DI rules on earnings 
as a fraction of average lost DI income.
We find that, in the short term (about two years after implementation of the 
reform), the more stringent DI rules increase the probability of receiving income 
from other social assistance programs by about 4.5 percentage points (on a base of 
14 percent), and the income from these other social assistance programs replaces 
30 percent of lost DI income. In other words, we find a substantial amount of social 
support substitution with a short-term benefit-substitution ratio of 0.30. The more 
stringent rules increase the probability of having any earnings by three percentage 
points (on a base of 35 percent) and also increase earnings on average. The additional 
earnings replace 62 percent of foregone DI income, yielding an earnings crowd-out 
ratio of 0.62. Recipients classified as fully disabled have a crowd-out ratio of 0.52, 
which is important evidence of a substantial labor supply response among long-term 
fully disabled individuals. Combining the effects of social assistance substitution 
and earnings crowd-out, we find that individuals are able to replace basically all of 
their foregone DI income on average. Specifically, we cannot reject that individuals 
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on average fully offset the cut in their DI benefit by increasing income from other 
social assistance programs and increasing earnings.
Our data allow us to follow the effects of the cohort discontinuity in the strin-
gency of the reforms over a seven-year period, from approximately two to eight 
years after implementation of the reforms. Over this period, the benefit-substitution 
ratio falls from 0.30 to 0.14, though even after eight years the benefit-substitution 
ratio is still statistically significant. The earnings crowd-out ratio remains roughly 
constant over this period. Spillovers between social assistance programs may oper-
ate not only through former DI recipients’ own choices, but could potentially also 
operate through the decisions of their spouses. However, we do not find any statisti-
cally significant evidence of responses by spouses in terms of labor supply or social 
assistance receipt. The point estimates indicate that spouses increase their labor sup-
ply but do not change their social assistance receipt. This implies that if we measure 
earnings crowd-out and benefit substitution at the household level rather than at the 
individual level, we find a higher earnings crowd-out ratio (about 18 percentage 
points higher) and a similar benefit-substitution ratio.
While the precise magnitudes of our findings are specific to this particular Dutch 
disability insurance reform, we believe our paper offers important lessons that are 
widely applicable. First, our evidence demonstrates that social support substitu-
tion occurs at an economically meaningful scale for prime-age disability insurance 
recipients. Hence, a carefully designed reform of a social assistance program would 
be well advised to take into account its effects on other social assistance programs. 
Second, our findings show that even long-term disability insurance recipients can 
still exhibit a meaningful rebound in their labor supply. Third, to measure the full 
impact of social insurance reforms on labor supply and reliance on other forms of 
social insurance, it is important to also consider effects over the longer term and to 
take possible behavioral responses of spouses into account.
Our findings on the existence of spillover effects between different social 
assistance programs confirm earlier results from other contexts.2 With respect to 
child-related benefits, Garrett and Glied (2000) show that the increase in child 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility in the early 1990s led to a greater 
increase in SSI enrollment in states with less generous benefits for Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC). Moreover, Schmidt and Sevak (2004) show that 
states that reduced the generosity of their AFDC program experienced increases 
in SSI enrollments. Both studies suggest that families substitute between SSI 
and AFDC. Kubik (2003) shows that the substitution of SSI for AFDC is larger 
in states with negative fiscal shocks, suggesting that states actively encourage this 
2 An exception is a paper by Autor and Duggan (2008), in which they exploit a ruling that suddenly expanded 
the eligibility for Veterans’ Disability Compensation (DC) for a subgroup of Vietnam Veterans. They find that the 
increased take-up of Veteran’s Disability Compensation due to this ruling raised the receipt of Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. As Autor and Duggan note, this result may be explained by the fact that one 
needs leave the labor force to qualify for SSDI, and leaving the labor force is less costly for people who already 
receive DC. Thus, this institutional feature may explain the complementarity between two social assistance pro-
grams in this case. Another exception is Inderbitzin, Staubli, and Zweimüller (2013), who find that extended UI 
(unemployment insurance) benefits for workers in their early fifties increases the probability that these workers 
subsequently use Austria’s relaxed DI systems for workers aged 55+ as a pathway to retirement. However, they do 
find that, for workers aged 55+, extended UI benefits substitute for DI.
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substitution (because the state-share in SSI payments is generally lower than the 
state-share in AFDC payments). Duggan and Kearney (2007) examine panel data to 
find that households in which a child becomes eligible for SSI subsequently receive 
less income from AFDC, WIC, and food stamps.3
Regarding substitution among programs focusing on adults, Bound (1989) 
already noted that DI and other social assistance programs can act as substitutes, 
though he does not provide formal estimates of this effect. Duggan, Singleton, and 
Song (2007), Li and Maestas (2008), and Coe and Haverstick (2010) exploit dif-
ferences by cohort in the generosity of Social Security retirement benefits to show 
that a reduction in these retirement benefits led to an increase in applications for or 
receipt of Social Security disability benefits. Koning and van Vuuren (2010) use 
Dutch administrative data to describe program enrollment after dismissal. They find 
that DI substitutes for UI but fail to find evidence that UI substitutes for DI. Using 
a regression discontinuity design, Lammers, Bloemen, and Hochguertel (2013) find 
that an increase in the stringency of job search requirements for older UI recipi-
ents in the Netherlands caused these recipients to be more likely to transition from 
UI to DI. Karlström, Palme, and Svensson (2008) use a difference-in-differences 
design to examine the effect of the abolition of DI as a path to early retirement 
for 60–64-year-olds in Sweden. They find that, in the two to three years follow-
ing the reform, this group responded by taking up other forms of social assistance 
rather than by increasing their labor supply. Finally, Staubli (2011) also uses a 
 difference-in-differences approach to show that a disability insurance reform that 
affected 55–56-year-old males in Austria had spillover effects on their take-up of 
unemployment insurance and sick leave, in addition to affecting their labor supply.
Our paper contributes to this literature by estimating substitution between social 
support programs for prime-age individuals in a setting that allows us to very cleanly 
identify the degree of spillovers between programs. In addition, we extend the litera-
ture by examining substitution effects over longer horizons (up to eight years after 
the reexaminations for our cohorts took place).
Our estimates also contribute to an extensive literature on the labor supply effects 
of disability insurance (see Bound and Burkhauser 1999 for an overview). Parsons 
(1980) presents cross-sectional evidence suggesting that the rise in DI generosity has 
contributed to the decline in male labor force participation. Gruber (2000) exploits a 
natural experiment in Canada and finds a sizeable labor force participation response 
from older workers to a change in the generosity of DI benefits. Much of the more 
recent work in the United States on labor supply effects of DI compares accepted to 
rejected DI applicants. Bound (1989), von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011), 
and Singleton (2012) compare accepted and rejected applicants directly, and those 
estimates are probably upper bounds of labor supply effects because there are likely 
unmeasured determinants of the rejection decision that are correlated with labor sup-
ply. To overcome this issue, other studies use plausibly exogenous variation in rejec-
tion rates. Gruber and Kubik (1997) use variation across states and time in rejection 
rates; Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) use an age discontinuity in rejection rates 
3 WIC (Women, Infants, and Children) provides nutritional assistance to low-income families with young chil-
dren and pregnant women.
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for a particular subgroup; De Jong, Lindeboom, and van der Klaauw (2011) use 
variation in screening severity induced by an experimental intervention; French and 
Song (2011) use variation in rejection rates due to the essentially random assign-
ment of administrative law judges to DI cases; and Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 
(2013) use variation in rejection rates due to the essentially random assignment 
of DI examiners to DI cases. These studies all find clear evidence of labor supply 
responses to disability insurance. Autor and Duggan (2003) exploit the interaction 
of state disability replacement rates with national changes in program stringency to 
find credible evidence that increased DI generosity reduced labor force participation 
of high school dropouts.
Despite this extensive literature, much less is known about the degree to which 
existing long-term DI recipients can be induced to work. A number of recent papers 
have started to amass evidence on this topic. Maestas and Song (2011) use the auto-
matic conversion of DI into Social Security benefits to show that there is a labor sup-
ply effect from DI on older disability insurance recipients. Campolieti and Riddell 
(2012) use a difference-in-differences design to show that an increase in the earn-
ings exemption increased the propensity to work among existing DI recipients in 
Canada. Moore (2012) examines the labor supply response of existing DI recipients 
who lost eligibility due to a 1996 US reform that removed alcohol and drug addic-
tions as disabling conditions. He finds a 22-percentage-point increase in employ-
ment as a result of these terminations, and notes that the employment response has 
an inverse-U shape with a maximum for those who have been on DI for about three 
years. Finally, Kostøl and Mogstad (2014) exploit a regression discontinuity to 
examine whether financial incentives can induce existing DI recipients in Norway 
to increase their labor supply. They find that prime-age DI recipients respond to 
these incentives but that DI recipients approaching retirement age do not show a 
significant response. Our study contributes to this emerging literature on the work 
capabilities of existing DI recipients; we provide well-identified estimates from a 
different setting to show strong labor supply responses to changes in DI generosity 
among prime-age long-term disability insurance recipients, including individuals 
classified as fully disabled.
I. The 1993 Dutch Disability Insurance Reform
After a waiting period of one year, individuals in the Netherlands are entitled to 
disability benefits if an illness or infirmity prevents them from earning the amount 
they used to earn before the onset of the disability.4 The replacement rate offered by 
DI depends on the “degree of disability,” which is defined by the percentage differ-
ence between the prior earnings and the remaining potential earnings capacity of the 
DI applicant. For readers familiar with the US disability system, it is useful to keep 
four key differences between the US and Dutch systems in mind. First, unlike the 
US system, the Dutch DI system insures against partial disability, and DI recipients 
4 Also see Bovenberg (2000), who provides useful institutional background information on the Dutch disability 
act. See García-Gómez, von Gaudecker, and Lindeboom (2011) for further background information and descriptive 
evidence of DI enrollment trends and patterns.
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in the Netherlands can simultaneously work (for the fraction of “remaining earnings 
capacity”) and receive DI (for the fraction of “lost earnings capacity”). Second, 
health insurance and other benefits are not tied to receipt of DI. Third, DI benefits 
are only paid to the disabled worker and not adjusted for dependents. Fourth, the 
replacement rate only depends on the disability rating, and does not vary by work 
history or by level of earnings below the maximal covered earnings. Moreover, the 
replacement rate for a fully disabled worker is 70 percent, which is much higher 
than the cash replacement rates of between 40 percent and 50 percent that Autor and 
Duggan (2003) estimate for US workers with median earnings.
In order to explain the cohort discontinuity in the 1993 DI reform, we first describe 
how the Dutch disability insurance system determined eligibility and replacement 
rates prior to the reform. Before 1993, the remaining earnings capacity was deter-
mined by the following procedure. First, a medical doctor examined the applicant 
and compiled a list of work activities that, according to the doctor’s judgment, the 
applicant could still perform.5 Second, using a dictionary of occupations that speci-
fied for each occupation the required education level and work activities, a list of 
occupations that an applicant could still perform was compiled, but occupations that 
were more than two “education levels” (on a seven-level scale) below the education 
level required for the applicant’s previous occupation were excluded. Finally, if the 
list contained at least five suitable occupations with at least ten active workers in 
the applicant’s region,6 then the mean wage of the five highest-paying occupations 
on the list was taken as the applicant’s potential earnings capacity. The loss of earn-
ings due to the disability, measured by the difference between the prior earnings 
and the potential earnings capacity, determined the individual’s disability rating, or 
“degree of disability.” If it was not possible to specify five suitable occupations with 
at least ten workers, the degree of disability was set at 100 percent. The measured 
disability ratings were grouped into eight categories varying from 0–15 percent to 
80–100 percent, and these categories determined the replacement rate (see Table 1). 
The replacement rate was applied to the individual’s indexed previous earnings, 
where the previous earnings were subject to a cap (about €36,000/year in 1999). 
Individuals on DI had an earnings exemption equal to their capped indexed previ-
ous earnings times the degree they were not disabled (which was set at 100 percent 
minus the lower bound of their degree-of-disability category). If a DI beneficiary 
chose to work and had earnings above this exemption, the person’s DI benefits were 
reduced in the short term and disability rating adjusted in the longer term (typi-
cally after about three years).7 Because adjustments due to earnings exceeding the 
5 The list includes 27 physical activities (such as “lifting,” “kneeling,” and “ability to deal with temperature 
fluctuations”) and 10 psychological abilities (such as “ability to work under time pressure,” “ability to perform 
monotonous work,” and “ability to deal with conflict”).
6 The Netherlands was divided up into five regions and 16 “start regions.” Alternative occupations had to be 
found in the “start regions” first. The labor market expert could only look for occupations in neighboring regions 
(within one of the main five regions) if the start region contained fewer than five suitable occupations.
7 In the short term, DI benefits are paid assuming the person’s degree of disability is reclassified based on his 
current earnings, but the reclassification does not formally happen because the higher level of earnings is not yet 
considered sufficient evidence of a lasting increase in earnings capacity. Instead, the actual reclassification only 
happens if the person has exceeded the earnings cap for three years, at which point the increase in earnings capac-
ity is considered lasting. Because 1999 is less than three years after the reexaminations took place for the cohorts 
relevant to our analysis, the disability ratings in 1999 do not depend on endogenous reactions to the reexaminations.
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 exemption amount took place independently of reexaminations, the anticipation 
of being reexamined provided no special incentive for individuals to adjust their 
earnings.
The DI reforms of 1993 tightened this procedure in two respects. First, the deter-
mination of disability had to be based on objective medical information. In other 
words, the applicant needed to have a clearly observable and functional work limi-
tation, as well as a plausible and direct relationship between the functional work 
limitation and the medical diagnosis. Second, the criteria for the list of qualify-
ing alternative occupations were relaxed: (i) occupations more than two education 
levels below the applicant’s education level were included from 1993 on, (ii) the 
list only needed to contain three qualifying alternative occupations (rather than 
five), and (iii) the geographic region in which these occupations had to exist with at 
least ten active workers was expanded roughly threefold.8 The remaining earnings 
capacity was henceforth determined by the three highest-paying occupations on the 
list. If these changes affected the remaining earnings capacity, they increased it, 
thereby decreasing the disability rating. The average of the highest-paying occupa-
tions must weakly rise as occupations were added the list. The average of the three 
highest-paying occupations is, by definition, weakly higher than the average of the 
five highest-paying occupations. Finally, the expanded list made it less likely that 
the list would not contain at least the minimum number (now three) of occupations 
needed to avoid declaring the applicant as fully disabled. As a result, for any given 
individual, the disability rating under the new criteria is always weakly lower than 
the disability rating this individual would have received under the old criteria.9 This 
means that no individual would have received a higher replacement rate under the 
8 Now, all suitable occupations within the main region (out of five main regions) where the individual is residing 
are used to calculate the potential earnings capacity.
9 Another important change of the 1993 DI reform was the introduction of an age- and duration-dependent 
benefit for new applicants. To those already receiving disability benefits as of August 1993 (i.e., the group that we 
are studying here), these changes did not apply and the benefit level remained a function of the indexed previous 
earnings.
Table 1—Relation between Degree of Disability and Replacement Rates
Range for degree of disability
(percentages)
Replacement rate 
(percent of last earned wage):
[80, 100] 70
[65, 80) 50.75
[55, 65) 42
[45, 55) 35
[35, 45) 28
[25, 35) 21
[15, 25) 14
[ 0, 15)  0
Notes: See text for a description of how the degree of disability is determined. Disability insur-
ance benefit levels are determined as a percentage of the last earned wage and adjusted for 
inflation over time.
Source: UWV (2006). UWV is the abbreviation of the agency that administers all social insur-
ance for employees in the Netherlands.
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new criteria than what this individual would have received if the old criteria had 
been used.
A reduction of the disability rating mechanically increased the earnings exemp-
tion. However, the net effect was still that, at any given level of earnings, DI benefits 
calculated under the new procedure were the same as or lower than DI benefits 
calculated under the old procedure. In other words, an individual’s budget set under 
the new procedure was weakly dominated by the budget set faced by this same indi-
vidual under the old procedure. It is important to note that the size of the benefit cut 
was not uniform across people, and we explore the heterogeneity in benefit reduc-
tions below.
The new procedure for determining benefits was applied to new DI applicants 
as well as to existing DI claimants who were 50 or younger at the time the reform 
went into effect. Because reexaminations of existing claimants are time-consuming, 
these reexaminations were scheduled to take place by cohort over a period of sev-
eral years. Disability claimants who were age 34 or younger on the August 1, 1993 
were reexamined in 1994, the 35–40-year-old cohort in 1995, the 41–44-year-old 
cohort in 1996–1997, and the 45–50-year-old cohort in 1997–2001. However, on 
November 12, 1996, a parliamentary motion was passed stipulating that the age 
45–50 cohort would be reexamined based on the previous and more generous pro-
cedure for determining replacement rates. This motion generated a discontinuity 
between the under-45 cohorts and the 45+ cohorts in the generosity of DI, and we 
exploit this discontinuity to estimate the effects of a decrease in DI generosity on 
the behavior of existing DI recipients.10 We note that we estimate the effect of a 
discontinuity in DI generosity in a context were everyone was reexamined (both the 
under-45 and the 45+ cohorts). If there is an interaction effect between a change in 
DI generosity and being reexamined, the effect of a change DI generosity on labor 
supply and social support substitution would be different in a context without any 
reexaminations.
II. Data
A. Data Sources
This paper uses administrative data that Statistics Netherlands has assembled 
from several sources. These data are merged at the individual level by using a 
so-called RIN-number (a coded version of the Dutch equivalent of the US Social 
Security number).11
We have administrative data (AO) on all disability benefit recipients aged 15–64 
in the Netherlands for the period 1995–2005. The data were collected by the orga-
nizations responsible for administering disability benefits and they contain the start 
and end dates of a disability spell, the disability rating (in categories), disability 
10 Because the discontinuity in the stringency of disability reform applies to existing recipients, we can estimate 
the effects of this discontinuity only for those who were receiving disability insurance at the time the reform went 
into effect. Our setting does not allow us to estimate effects stemming from people who would have flowed into DI 
under the less stringent rules but not under the more stringent rules.
11 Researchers can use these data via a remote-access computer after signing a confidentiality agreement.
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 benefit payments, earnings prior to the DI spell, and the reason for the termina-
tion of the disability spell. However, the data do not contain reliable or consistent 
 information about industry or about the medical condition that gave rise to the dis-
ability spell.
We obtained the demographic characteristics of the disability claimants from the 
municipal registries (GBA), which contain all residents of the Netherlands. This 
database includes information on each person’s month and year of birth, marital 
status, number of children, national origin, and place of residence, as well as the 
identification numbers (RIN-codes) of their partners. The RIN-codes of the partners 
allow us to merge in data on income sources of the partner. We collected the demo-
graphic characteristics as of January 1996, which is the start of our sample period.
Finally, we obtained information on labor market earnings and sources of social 
assistance income other than DI by merging five administrative datasets: earnings 
of all employees, self-employment earnings, unemployment benefits (WW), general 
assistance (Bijstand), and receipt of any other form of social assistance (from about 
30 relatively minor programs). Data on social assistance come from the organi-
zations that administer these programs. Information about the earnings from paid 
labor and self-employment are gathered by Statistics Netherlands using information 
from the tax authorities and social insurance records. All these files are available 
from 1999 onward, which is why 1999 is the start year for our empirical analysis. 
Unemployment insurance covers any income loss due to unemployment for a dura-
tion of up to five years, where the duration depends on one’s work history. General 
assistance is unlimited in duration and does not require dependents (unlike the US 
welfare program), but it is means tested. Apart from the programs mentioned here, 
there are no additional cash social assistance programs in the Netherlands that are 
relevant for individuals in the age range of our sample. Exact variable definitions are 
provided in online Appendix B.
B. Sample Definition
In our baseline analysis, we restrict the sample to all individuals (i) who received 
disability benefits on August 1, 1993, (ii) who were between the ages of 42.5 and 
47.5 at that date, and (iii) who were still on DI as of January 1, 1996. The first restric-
tion is necessary because the discontinuity in benefit rules only applied to existing 
claimants on the date the reform went into effect. The second restriction limits the 
sample to cohorts close to the age where the discontinuity in benefit rules occurs. 
We selected the bandwidth of +/− 2.5 years based on the criterion by Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2012).12 The last restriction is driven by data availability. While our 
data on disability start in 1995, the information in the 1995 file does not contain 
earnings prior to DI, so we use the files from 1996 onward instead. Thus, we can 
only observe individuals who were on disability at the time the reform legislation 
was passed if they remained on disability until January of 1996 or later. We believe 
12 The Imbens-Kalyanaraman criterion yields different optimal bandwidths for different outcome variables. 
Rather than changing the sample for each outcome variable, we selected a bandwidth in the middle of the range 
suggested by the Imbens-Kalyanaraman criterion, and applied this bandwidth to all our specifications.
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it highly unlikely that differential attrition occurred around the age discontinuity 
prior to January of 1996, as the reexaminations for the individuals in our sample did 
not start until later in 1996 and the government decided only in November of 1996 
that the age 45+ cohort would not be subject to the new, more stringent criteria.13 
Hence, only after the start of our sample period did DI recipients become aware 
of the discontinuity in benefit generosity that we exploit in our analysis. A plot of 
the density of disability claimants by cohort is relatively smooth and further allevi-
ates any concerns about differential attrition prior to the start of our sample period 
(see online Appendix Figure A1). The plot also indicates that heaping-induced bias 
(Barreca, Lindo, and Waddell 2011) is not a concern and that there is no discontinu-
ity in the density around the cutoff age of 45 ( p-value of 0.126 in the McCrary 2008 
density test). We end our sample in 2005 because DI was fundamentally reformed 
in 2006.
We exclude all individuals who appeared on more than one disability record in 
our data in a given month (about 3 percent of the sample). We exclude these obser-
vations because it is not clear whether they reflect administrative/coding errors or 
whether they truly concern individuals who are entitled to multiple different disabil-
ity insurance benefits. We have checked that no discontinuity occurs at age 45 in the 
likelihood that an individual has more than one disability record. Therefore, we are 
not concerned that the omission or inclusion of the 3 percent of observations with 
multiple records would substantively affect our results. After these sample restric-
tions, our baseline sample contains 84,185 observations.
C. Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics for our key variables. Panel A shows the char-
acteristics of our sample measured as of January 1996 (before the reexaminations 
took place). About one-third of disability claimants are female and about two-thirds 
are married. The average DI spell started in 1985. Thus, when the reform was imple-
mented in 1996–1998 for the cohorts in our sample, the average claimant in our data 
had been on DI for more than a decade. About two-thirds of the sample is classified 
as fully disabled (earnings capacity reduction of 80 percent or more) and is therefore 
eligible for a replacement rate of 70 percent. The fraction fully disabled is mark-
edly higher among females than among males. Only about 4 percent of the sam-
ple is considered to have lost between 55 percent and 80 percent of their earnings 
capacity. The remaining 30 percent of the sample is considered to have lost between 
15  percent and 55 percent of their earnings capacity and is eligible for replacement 
rates between 14 percent and 35 percent. The last two columns of Table 2 compare 
the under-45 cohort to the 45+ cohort. Their sample means are reasonably similar. 
Of course, our RD (regression discontinuity) design allows for smooth differences 
in characteristics by cohort. Only discontinuities in characteristics at the age cutoff 
would be problematic, and we will test for such discontinuities in the next section.
13 Please note that we refer to cohorts by their age as of August 1, 1993.
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Table 2—Descriptive Statistics 
Full Age Age
 sample Males Females 42.50–44.99 45.00–47.49
Panel A. Sample characteristics, measured prior to reexamination
Female (0=no; 1=yes) 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.34
Married (0=no; 1=yes) 0.66 0.69 0.61 0.65 0.67
Age on August 1, 1993 45.18 45.19 45.18 43.70 46.27
Start date of DI spell (year) 1985.1 1984.8 1985.7 1985.3 1985.0
Degree of disability (percent of earnings capacity lost):
 [15–25) 7.67 8.85 5.36 9.70 6.12
 [25–35) 9.53 11.96 4.74 10.73 8.61
 [35–45) 6.91 8.75 3.28 6.98 6.85
 [45–55) 5.78 6.32 4.74 5.37 6.10
 [55–65) 2.01 2.22 1.60 1.97 2.04
 [65–80) 1.97 2.41 1.11 1.93 2.00
 [80–100] 66.10 59.50 79.17 63.32 68.28
Panel B. outcomes after reexamination
Labor market status in 1999 (percent):
 Still on DI (on the original spell) 91.75 91.68 91.89 87.25 95.18
 Employed 35.75 44.78 18.03 39.14 33.18
 Reentry in DI (new spell) 0.23 0.20 0.30 0.37 0.13
 Other social assistance 15.32 14.63 16.68 17.83 13.41
 Zero income (dummy for no formal income) 3.91 3.66 4.39 4.24 3.66
Labor market status in 2005 (percent):
 Still on DI (on the original spell) 81.01 80.04 82.91 76.63 84.34
 Employed 28.84 36.36 14.09 33.03 25.67
 Reentry in DI (new spell) 4.62 4.33 5.18 5.50 3.95
 Other social assistance 21.44 23.28 17.84 20.83 21.91
 Zero income (dummy for no formal income) 8.46 8.97 7.46 8.39 8.51
Income by source in 1999, €/year (including zeros):
 DI from original DI spell 10,296 11,135 8,649 9,299 11,054
 Earnings 5,916 7,753 2,309 6,500 5,471
 New DI spell 25 22 31 39 15
 Other social assistance 924 839 1,089 1,060 820
Income by source in 1999, €/year (if nonzero):
 DI from original DI spell 11,731 12,732 9,785 11,201 12,098
 Earnings 17,045 17,814 13,282 17,118 16,979
 New DI spell 10,715 11,105 10,206 10,568 11,027
 Other social assistance 6,080 5,811 6,543 6,008 6,153
Income by source in 2005, €/year (including zeros):
 DI from original DI spell 11,421 12,343 9,611 10,351 12,235
 Earnings 5,452 7,136 2,145 6,485 4,666
 New DI spell 618 624 606 692 561
 Other social assistance 1,322 1,231 1,501 1,233 1,389
Income by source in 2005, €/year (if nonzero):
 DI from original DI spell 14,491 15,887 11,862 13,920 14,884
 Earnings 20,136 20,889 16,308 20,822 19,460
 New DI spell 13,376 14,390 11,709 14,204 12,593
 Other social assistance 6,185 5,307 8,433 5,951 6,353
Observations 84,185 55,772 28,413 36,362 47,823
Notes: Since we have information available from 1996 onward, both marital status and degree of disability are 
recorded in January 1996 (before the reexaminations). Age is measured as of August 1, 1993, so age is a measure 
for cohort.
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Panel B presents the means of our key outcome variables. We only present the 
values for 1999 and 2005 in the interest of space. In 1999, about one to three years 
after the reexaminations took place for the age cohorts in our sample, 92 percent 
of those on DI at the start of 1996 were still on DI (where being on DI in 1999 is 
defined as having received positive income from DI in that year). About 36 percent 
of our sample was working, defined as having positive earnings (including those 
from self-employment) in 1999, which is consistent with DI also covering partial 
disability in the Netherlands. Of those who had left DI, 53 percent were employed, 
whereas 33 percent of those on DI were employed; thus, a considerable number 
combined DI receipt with work. The fraction of men working (45 percent) was more 
than twice as high as the fraction of females with positive earnings (18 percent). 
Fifteen percent of our sample also had social assistance income other than DI in 
1999. Another 4 percent were not observed in any of our administrative files. Most 
of these individuals did not have any formal labor or social assistance income in 
1999, but about one-third of them died or emigrated during our sample period.14
In 1999, the average income in our sample was about €17,000, of which roughly 
two-thirds came from DI benefits, with the remaining third coming mostly from 
earnings. Income from other social assistance programs accounted only for about 
6 percent of total income. In 2005, about seven to nine years after the reexamina-
tions, 81 percent of those on DI at the start of 1996 were still on DI. Between 1999 
and 2005, the fraction employed fell from 36 percent to 29 percent, and the frac-
tion with income from social assistance other than DI increased from 15 percent to 
21 percent. These trends are consistent with the general decline in labor force partic-
ipation in the Netherlands as people approach retirement. In 2005, about  two-thirds 
of total income in our sample still came from DI benefits.
III. Results
A. magnitude of the reform
To what extent did the more stringent reexaminations reduce the generosity of the 
DI program for the under-45 cohort? The answer to this question allows us to inter-
pret the magnitude of the effects of the reform on earnings and on receipt of other 
forms of social assistance. Figure 1 shows three measures by which to gauge the 
magnitude of the reform: the effect on benefit amounts, the effect on replacement 
rates, and the effect on participation in the DI program.
Panel A plots annual disability benefit amounts by cohort in 1999, including zeros 
for those who exited. Visually, there is a clear discontinuity at the cutoff age. We 
estimate the size of this discontinuity by running an OLS regression of the outcome 
variable on a treatment dummy that equals 1 for cohorts subject to the more strin-
gent reexaminations (i.e., age less than 45), a linear term in age, and an  interaction 
14 About 1.1 percent of our sample had died by 1999 and 0.3 percent had emigrated. These observations are 
included in the main analysis and their income and participation variables are all set to zero in 1999. Results are 
extremely similar if we exclude these observations altogether. The discontinuity in the stringency of the reexamina-
tion had no significant impact on the probability of death or the probability of emigration.
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Estimate of the discontinuity: −1.076 (0.096)***
Estimate of the discontinuity: −0.059 (0.003)***
Estimate of the discontinuity: −0.038 (0.004)***
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Figure 1. Magnitude of the Reform
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each figure is based on 84,185 observations. The 
dotted lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. Regression estimates come from 
reduced-form RD regressions without demographic control variables.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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of the treatment dummy with the variable [age−45]. All ages are specified as of 
August 1, 1993, so they effectively measure cohorts. We run this specification for all 
RD estimates reported in the figures in the paper. The fitted regression line is indi-
cated in the plot, and the RD estimate on the treatment dummy is −1.076, indicating 
that the more stringent reexaminations for the younger cohort reduced their annual 
DI benefits by €1,076, or about 10 percent. All reduced-form RD estimates can be 
seen as local average treatment effects—local in the sense that they only apply at 
the discontinuity (i.e., for the cohort turning 45 on August 1, 1993) and average 
in the sense that it is the average effect for all those at the discontinuity. The key 
identifying assumption behind all of our RD estimates is that the only discontinu-
ous change at the age cutoff is the stringency of the DI reexaminations. While we 
cannot test this assumption, we know of no other policy changes that would create a 
discontinuity at this cutoff. Further, when we run our reduced-form RD specification 
using all of our demographic characteristics as dependent variables, only 2 out of 
the 39 regression coefficients are significant.15 Moreover, the RD coefficients in the 
placebo regressions are jointly insignificant ( p -value: 0.4990).
Panel B of Figure 1 shows that the replacement rate, including zeros for those who 
exited, is 5.9 percentage points lower for the affected cohort at the discontinuity.16 
The average replacement rate for those who just escaped the more stringent reex-
aminations is 0.55; the 5.9-percentage-point drop therefore represents an 11 percent 
decline. Panel C shows that the fraction of the sample that is still on the original 
DI spell in 1999 falls discontinuously by 3.8 percentage points at the age cutoff. 
Overall, Figure 1 shows that the more stringent reexaminations roughly translate 
into a 10 percent benefit reduction, though it should be kept in mind that the size of 
the benefit cut was not uniform across individuals. The effects of the reform on labor 
supply and other benefit receipt should be viewed in light of this magnitude.
Given that the benefit cuts were not uniform, we want to determine whose benefits 
were reduced by the reform. In other words, we want to describe the demographic 
composition of those who would not experience a reduction in their disability rating 
(and, thus, benefits) under the less stringent reexamination, but do experience such a 
reduction under the more stringent reexamination. Following standard IV terminol-
ogy, we refer to this group as the compliers.17 Because the definition of compliers is 
based on a counterfactual outcome, the demographic characteristics of the compli-
ers cannot simply be measured. However, as detailed in online Appendix A, we can 
15 The full results are presented in online Appendix Table A1. It would be instructive to do similar checks on 
the identification strategy with our key outcome variables: labor income and income from other social assistance 
programs. Unfortunately, we do not have data on these variables prior to 1999.
16 The data do not contain the post-reform replacement rate for those who exited from the DI administration. 
Based on discussions with the DI administration and based on the economic incentives faced by beneficiaries, our 
understanding is that most exits occurred for those who were no longer eligible for DI. In particular, beneficiaries 
who had their benefits reduced to zero because of excess earnings could nevertheless stay in the DI administra-
tion with a positive disability rating (and, therefore, a nonzero nominal replacement rate) for about three years. 
Individuals had an incentive to do so because it gave them the option of receiving future DI benefits without having 
to requalify if their earnings would fall back. However, we cannot completely rule out that some of those who exited 
from the DI administration were still eligible for a positive replacement rate.
17 Although the term complier is standard IV terminology, it is somewhat counterintuitive in our setting, as 
“compliance” in our setting is determined by the procedure that translates the results of the reexamination into 
benefit levels rather than by decisions on the part of the DI recipient.
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infer the demographic characteristics of compliers by exploiting regression discon-
tinuities in demographic characteristics within the subsample of individuals who 
experienced a drop in replacement rates. We estimate that 13 percent of the sample 
consists of compliers. We find that, among compliers, the fraction who are female 
is 13 percentage points lower than the entire sample, the fraction who are fully 
disabled is 19 percentage points lower, and the fraction who are married is 13 per-
centage points higher (full results are in online Appendix Table A2). All of these 
differences are statistically significant. Thus, male, partially disabled, and married 
individuals were more likely to experience a reduction in their benefits than the 
sample as a whole. In line with these findings, we later split estimates out by gender, 
by degree of disability, and by marital status (in Tables 6 and A7).
Because we do not have income measures from before the reform, we cannot esti-
mate the effects of the reform on income from labor and from other social assistance 
programs separately for those staying on DI and for those leaving DI.18 However, 
we do have the replacement rate prior to the reexamination, which allows us to 
examine heterogeneity in the effects of the reform on replacement rates.
The first column of Table 3 shows the change in replacement rates at age 45.0 for 
those subject to the less stringent reexamination.19 About 72 percent of this group 
saw no change in their replacement rate, 12 percent experienced an increase in their 
replacement rate, and 16 percent faced a decrease in their replacement rate. The 
second column shows the change in replacement rates at age 45.0 for those who 
underwent the more stringent reexamination. A much larger fraction (29 percent) 
in this latter group experienced a reduction in their replacement rate, and a much 
lower fraction (5 percent) saw an increase in their replacement rate. Still, even in the 
group subject to the more stringent reexamination, about two-thirds experienced no 
change in their replacement rate. The third column shows the treatment effect of the 
more stringent reexamination on the change in replacement rate, which is simply the 
difference between the first two columns. This column shows a downward shift in 
probability mass throughout the distribution of changes in replacement rates, show-
ing that the reexamination made DI less generous throughout the distribution. Using 
the estimates of the causal effects of the more stringent reexamination on the full 
transition matrix of replacement rates (presented in online Appendix Table A3), we 
find that 70 percent of the reductions in replacement rates caused by the more strin-
gent reexamination occurred among people who remained eligible for DI and that 
18 We do have covered earnings (but not income) prior to the start of the DI spell. Even though these earnings 
are, on average, more than a decade old and capped, we will later use them to get a rough sense of the heterogeneity 
of the impact of the more stringent reform on living standards.
19 We run our standard reduced-form RD specification using dummies for each possible change in the replace-
ment rate as the dependent variables. We estimate changes in the replacement rate at age 45.0 for those subject to 
the less stringent reexamination as the intercept of the right segment of the regression line at age 45.0. Changes in 
replacement rate for those subject to the more stringent reexamination are estimated by the intercept of the left seg-
ment of the regression line at age 45.0. More detailed estimates are provided in online Appendix Table A3, which 
presents the joint distribution of the replacement rate in 1996 (pre-reform) and 1999 (post-reform) at age 45.0 for 
those who were subject to the less stringent reexamination rules, as well as the impact of the reform on these joint 
probabilities (estimated by the RD effect). For example, the table shows that the more stringent reexaminations 
raised the fraction of fully disabled removed from the program from 9.2 percent (= 6.14/66.93) to 11.8 percent 
(= (6.14 + 1.75)/66.93). The estimates in Table 3 summarize all joint probabilities of online Appendix Table A3 
by presenting the sums of the diagonal entries of the Appendix table.
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the remaining 30 percent occurred among those who lost eligibility. These figures 
remain similar if we weight the causal effects on the reductions by the size of the 
reduction rather than by the number of people experiencing them.
As an additional partial check on our identifying assumption that no factors 
besides the DI reexaminations had a discontinuous impact at age 45, Figure 2 reports 
DI exit rates separately for 1995, 1996/1997, 1998, and 1999. Exit is defined as the 
end date of the original DI spell, as recorded in the administrative data file, occur-
ring during the year in question. We calculate these rates as fractions of DI claimants 
in our sample on January 1, 1996.20 Since no reexaminations took place in 1995 
for DI claimants in the age 40+ cohorts, a discontinuity at age 45 in the 1995 exit 
rate would invalidate our identifying assumption. Reassuringly, the 1995 exit rate 
shows no sign of a discontinuity at age 45. In 1996 and 1997, the age 40–44 cohort 
was reexamined as well as part of the age 45 cohort. In precisely these years, the 
discontinuity at age 45 is very pronounced. In 1998, the remainder of the age 45 
cohort and some of the age 46 cohort were reexamined, which explains the statisti-
cally significant discontinuity in the opposite direction. This discontinuity, however, 
is much smaller in size than those in other years because the age 45+ cohort was 
reexamined under the older and less stringent standards. Hence, if we calculate the 
20 However, the exit rate for 1995 is calculated as a fraction of DI recipients as of January 1, 1995.
Table 3—Reexaminations and the Change in the Replacement Rate between 1996 and 1999
Change in the 
replacement rate
Predicted probability
at age 45.0 for the 
less stringent 
reexamination
(1)
Predicted probability
at age 45.0 for the
more stringent 
reexamination
(2)
Treatment effect of the more 
stringent examination on the 
probability of the specified 
change in replacement rate
(3)
7 “steps” less generous 6.14 7.89 1.75 (0.35)
6 “steps” less generous 0.46 1.56 1.09 (0.10)
5 “steps” less generous 0.85 2.41 1.56 (0.13)
4 “steps” less generous 1.08 2.25 1.17 (0.14)
3 “steps” less generous 1.09 2.30 1.21 (0.16)
2 “steps” less generous 2.17 3.69 1.52 (0.21)
1 “step” less generous 3.94 8.99 5.06 (0.29)
Same generosity 72.17 65.52 −6.65 (0.59)
1 “step” more generous 3.52 1.40 −2.12 (0.18)
2 “steps” more generous 1.46 0.67 −0.79 (0.12)
3 “steps” more generous 1.57 0.90 −0.66 (0.14)
4 “steps” more generous 1.87 0.91 −0.96 (0.14)
5 “steps” more generous 2.13 0.85 −1.28 (0.15)
6 “steps” more generous 1.54 0.66 −0.89 (0.12)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each row is estimated using our standard reduced-form RD regression 
without demographic controls, where the outcome variable is a dummy for the change in the replacement rate 
between 1996 and 1999 that corresponds to row header. There are eight possible replacement rates (in percent-
ages): 0, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 50.75, and 70, where we assign 0 to those who exit from DI before the postexamina-
tion replacement rate is recorded. The number of “steps” counts by how many distinct levels the replacement rate 
changed. For example, going to the next higher replacement rate (e.g., from 28 percent to 35 percent) is called 
a “1 step” increase in the generosity of the replacement rate. Column 1 shows the intercept at age 45.0 from the 
regression line to the right of the discontinuity (i.e., for those who underwent the less stringent reexamination), col-
umn 2 shows the intercept at age 45.0 from the regression line to the left of the discontinuity (i.e., for those who 
underwent the more stringent reexamination), and column 3 shows the treatment effect (i.e., the difference between 
columns 1 and 2). N=84,185. Age is measured as of August 1, 1993, so age is a measure for cohort.
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total exit rate over the 1996–1998 period, we find a discontinuous increase in exit for 
the group subject to the more stringent reexaminations. In 1999, all the reexamina-
tions for the age 44–45 cohort were completed, and we find no discontinuity in exit 
rates at the age cutoff.
B. reduced-Form Impacts on Labor market and Social Assistance outcomes
To what extent did individuals whose DI was reduced by the reform end up in 
other social assistance programs, and to what extent did they find paid work? The 
answer to this question is critical for judging the effectiveness of the reform. In the 
former case, the reform merely shuffles individuals across programs, and budget-
ary savings only occur to the extent that benefits in other programs are lower than 
DI benefits. In the latter case, increased earnings are an indication of moral hazard 
among existing disability recipients. In this subsection, we examine labor market 
and social assistance outcomes in 1999 (about two years after the reexaminations 
took place), which is the first year for which we have the required data. In subsec-
tion IIIF, we will examine the effects over a longer horizon.
We start by analyzing the reduced-form effects of the more stringent reexamina-
tion (and the associated benefit cuts) on receipt of other forms of social assistance. 
The first panel of Figure 3 plots income from social assistance other than DI by 
cohort. The figure shows an upward jump in income from other social assistance 
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programs for the cohort that underwent the more stringent reexamination. In fact, 
the RD regression estimates that the more stringent reexamination increased other 
social assistance income by €305 per year. The second panel shows that the frac-
tion receiving any social assistance income from a source other than DI discontinu-
ously increases by 4.6 percentage points at the age cutoff for the more stringent 
 reexaminations. Both increases are highly significant and represent an increase of 
about one-third in relative terms. In other words, we find clear evidence of substitu-
tion of other forms of social assistance for DI benefits.
Do people who leave DI fully account for the increased income from other social 
assistance programs, or do those who remain on DI also receive more income from 
other social assistance programs? To answer this question, we first note that there 
are two types of individuals who exited from DI: (i) those who exited from DI under 
the more stringent reexamination but would not have exited from DI under the less 
stringent reexamination (marginal leavers) and (ii) those who would have exited 
anyway (inframarginal leavers). Panel C of Figure 1 allows us to determine the 
population fractions of marginal and inframarginal leavers. Just to the right of the 
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Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dotted lines represent the 95 percent confi-
dence intervals. The exit rate is defined as a fraction of our sample in January 1996, except for 
panel A where it is a fraction of the sample in January 1995. Regression estimates come from 
reduced-form RD regressions without demographic control variables.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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age discontinuity, individuals faced the less stringent reexamination and all leavers 
are  therefore inframarginal leavers by definition. The DI participation rate just to the 
right of the age continuity is 93.2 percent (see panel C of Figure 1), so 6.8 percent 
(= 100 − 93.2) of individuals are inframarginal leavers. Individuals just to the left 
of the age discontinuity faced the more stringent reexamination, so leavers just to 
the left consist of both inframarginal and marginal leavers. The participation rate 
just to the left of the discontinuity is 89.4 percent, which implies that inframarginal 
Estimate of the discontinuity: 305 (50)***  
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Figure 3. Effects of DI Reform on Social Assistance Other than Disability Insurance
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Figures are based on 84,185 observations. The dot-
ted lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. Social Assistance Income excludes any 
benefits from DI (both from the original spell or any new spell). Similarly, Social Assistance 
Participation excludes participation in DI. Regression estimates come from regressions with-
out demographic control variables.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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and marginal leavers combined comprise 10.6 percent (= 100 − 89.4) of the popu-
lation. Hence, marginal leavers make up 3.8 percent (= 10.6 − 6.8). This means 
that 35.8  percent (= 3.8/10.6) of all leavers to the left of the discontinuity are mar-
ginal leavers and 64.2 percent are inframarginal leavers.
We note that inframarginal leavers cannot be responsible for the jump in social 
assistance receipt observed in panel A of Figure 3, because inframarginal leavers, 
by definition, are not affected by an increase in the stringency of the reexamina-
tion (they would have exited in any case). So, to the extent that this jump is caused 
by leavers, it must be caused by marginal leavers. To find the degree to which 
this jump can be attributed to marginal leavers, we rerun the RD regression of 
panel A of Figure 3, but now on the subsample of those who left DI. The result-
ing regression line (not shown) just to the right of the age cutoff lies at €1,962 
of other social assistance income per year. Because just to the right of the age 
cutoff all leavers are inframarginal by definition, this implies that other social 
assistance income is equal to €1,962 per year for inframarginal leavers. Just to 
the left of the age cutoff, where we have both marginal and inframarginal leavers, 
the regression line lies at €2,564 per year. Thus, the weighted average of income 
from other social assistance programs for all leavers to the left of the discontinu-
ity must equal €2,564, which implies that income from other social assistance for 
marginal leavers must have been €3,644 per year (so that 35.8 percent of €3,644 
plus 64.2 percent of €1,962 equals €2,564). If marginal leavers receive €3,644 per 
year from other social assistance, the maximum amount by which their income 
from other social assistance programs could have possibly increased due to the 
more stringent reexamination is €3,644. Given that marginal leavers comprise 
only 3.8 percent of the entire sample (so both stayers and leavers) at the age cut-
off, they can, at most, account for an increase of 0.038 × 3,644 = €138 in the RD 
estimate of €305/year that we found for the entire sample. Thus, we conclude that 
those leaving DI altogether can be responsible for at most 43 percent (= 138/305) 
of the overall jump in income from other social assistance programs, and that at 
least 57 percent must be due to increases in other social assistance income among 
those remaining on DI.
In Figure 4, we examine the extent to which individuals subject to the stricter 
reexaminations were more likely to receive income from new DI spells. In 1999, this 
occurred only to a minimal extent. Among those facing the more stringent reexami-
nation, annual income from new DI spells is a statistically insignificant €8 higher. 
The participation rate in new DI spells is 0.2 percentage points higher, which is 
statistically significant but still small relative to the 3.8 percent of DI recipients who 
were induced to leave due to the more stringent reexamination. As we will show 
below, reentry into DI becomes more important over time.
Next, we present the reduced-form effects of the more stringent reexamination 
on labor market outcomes. The first panel of Figure 5 plots earnings  (including 
 self-employment income) in 1999 by cohort. The figure shows a discontinuity in 
earnings at the cutoff age, but the discontinuity is not as visually compelling as in 
the earlier figures. The RD regression estimates that earnings are €624 per year 
higher at the cutoff age for those who were subject to the more stringent reexami-
nation, and this estimate is highly significant. The €624 increase represents an 
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11 percent increase in annual earnings. This figure establishes our qualitative find-
ing that disability income crowds out labor income. It also contributes to the lit-
erature on the labor supply disincentive effects of disability insurance by showing 
clear evidence of labor supply responses among prime-age DI recipients who are 
 long-term recipients of DI (durations of at least two years at the time of the reform, 
but of ten years on average). We will discuss the economic magnitude of the labor 
supply response in the next subsection.
Estimate of the discontinuity: 8 (9)
Estimate of the discontinuity: 0.002 (0.001)*** 
0
100
200
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
In
co
m
e 
in
 1
99
9 
fr
om
 n
ew
 D
I s
pe
ll 
(€/
yr
)
Cohort (age as of 8/1/93)
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
F
ra
ct
io
n 
in
 1
99
9 
th
at
 h
as
 r
ee
nt
er
ed
 D
I
Cohort (age as of 8/1/93)
Panel A. Income in 1999 from new DI spell
Panel B. Fraction that has reentered DI by 1999
Figure 4. Effects of DI Reform on Reentry into DI
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Figures are based on 84,185 observations. The dot-
ted lines represent the 95-percent confidence intervals. Only DI income and participation in 
DI that originate from spells that started after the reexamination are included in this figure. 
Regression estimates come from regressions without demographic control variables.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Because we do not have earnings for prior years, we cannot precisely deter-
mine the extent to which the average increase in earnings stems from nonworkers 
finding employment (extensive margin) or from workers increasing their earnings 
(intensive margin). However, at least some of the increase comes from the extensive 
margin because the second panel of Figure 5 shows a clear discontinuity in the frac-
tion of individuals with strictly positive income from wages or self-employment. 
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Figure 5. Effects of DI Reform on Labor Market Outcomes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Figures are based on 84,185 observations. The 
dotted lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. Employment is defined as having 
positive earnings from employment or self-employment. Regression estimates come from 
reduced-form RD regressions without demographic control variables.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The RD regression estimates that the more stringent reexamination caused the frac-
tion employed to increase by 2.9 percentage points. To explain the observed increase 
in earnings in the absence of an intensive-margin labor supply response, average 
earnings for those who started working would need to be €21,500 (= 624/0.029) 
per year, which is higher than the observed average earnings for those with positive 
earnings (€17,000 per year). It therefore seems likely that some of the response also 
occurred along the intensive margin. When we do a bounding calculation similar to 
the one we did above for income from other social benefits, we find that those who 
left DI altogether can be responsible for at most 61 percent of the overall jump in 
earnings caused by the more stringent reexamination, and that at least 39 percent 
must be due to earnings increases among those remaining on DI.
C. Benefit Substitution and Earnings crowd-out
Figures 3 and 5 establish that people substitute between DI income and other 
forms of social assistance, and that DI benefits crowd out labor income. We now 
turn to the economic magnitudes of earnings crowd-out and substitution of social 
assistance. In the first column of Table 4, we scale our reduced-form estimates by 
the amount by which disability benefits from the original spell decrease at the age 
discontinuity, whereas in the second column, we scale by the discontinuity in the 
replacement rate. We implement this scaling by running IV regressions following 
the standard “fuzzy” rD specification.21 We include a rich set of demographic con-
trol variables to increase the precision of the estimates. As should be the case with 
a valid RD design, the control variables do not substantially affect the magnitudes 
of our estimates (see online Appendix Table A4 for the corresponding estimates 
without controls). Given that the reexamination was, in all respects, more strin-
gent for those below the cutoff age, the monotonicity assumption required for the 
fuzzy RD design should be satisfied; being subject to a reexamination following 
the more stringent new protocol rather than the old protocol weakly decreases the 
benefit amount and weakly decreases the replacement rate at any level of earnings 
for any given individual (despite the increase in the earnings exemption). We do not 
interpret these IV estimates as causal impacts of the level of DI benefits per se or as 
causal estimates of the DI replacement rate per se because the reduction in benefits 
and replacement rates was not uniform. In fact, the reduction varied across individu-
als and by earnings level for any given individual. The response to the benefit cuts 
is likely not only a function of the level of the cuts, but also of the heterogeneity in 
the cuts. We therefore see the IV estimates as a way to relate the magnitudes of the 
behavior effects of the reform to alterative measures of the size of the reform. In 
other words, we view this primarily as a scaling exercise.
Panel A of Table 4 shows that there is only a minimal increase in income from or 
participation in new DI spells in the short term (roughly two years after the reex-
aminations) in response to the benefit and replacement rate reductions. For example, 
for every €1,000 reduction in existing DI benefits, the increased expenditure on new 
21 Excellent discussions of the theory and practice of RD methods can be found in Hahn, Todd, and van der 
Klaauw (2001), Imbens and Lemieux (2008), and Lee and Lemieux (2010).
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DI spells is €8 (not significant). Panel B examines the extent to which the reduced 
generosity of disability benefits induces individuals to shift to other forms of social 
assistance. The first row in column 1 of panel B shows that, for a €1 reduction in 
disability benefits, individuals receive €0.30 more from other social assistance pro-
grams in 1999. Thus, the benefit-substitution ratio is 0.30. A government not tak-
ing this substitution into account would overestimate the reduction in government 
expenditure from tightening the DI eligibility rules by 43 percent. The second row 
shows that for each €1,000 decrease in annual DI benefits caused by the more strin-
gent rules, the probability that an individual receives income from another social 
assistance program increases by 4.4 percentage points. An alternative way of  scaling 
the degree of substitution between social assistance programs is provided in the 
second column, which shows that, for a 10-percentage-point reduction in disability 
replacement rates, income from other social assistance programs increases by €521 
per year (an increase of more than 50 percent) and the probability of participation in 
Table 4—Earnings Crowd-Out and Benefit Shifting 
Effect scaled by decrease in 
amount of original DI
(in 1,000 €/year)
Effect scaled by decrease
in the replacement rate (fraction)
Panel A. New DI benefit in 1999
 Income from a new DI spell 0.008
(0.008)
0.142
(0.148)
 Participation dummy 0.001
(0.001)**
0.026
(0.011)**
Panel B. other social assistance in 1999
 Income from other social assistance 0.297
(0.047)***
5.212
(0.787)***
 Participation dummy 0.044
(0.005)***
0.778
(0.081)***
Panel c. Labor market outcomes in 1999
 Earnings 0.618
(0.108)***
10.848
(1.924)***
 Employment dummy 0.029
(0.005)***
0.511
(0.084)***
Panel D. Total
 Income except from original DI spell 0.923
(0.113)***
16.201
(1.983)***
 Dummy for work or other social assistance 0.057
(0.006)***
0.992
(0.092)***
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each entry in the table comes from a separate IV regression based on the 
fuzzy RD design. The dependent variable is listed in the rows. Other social assistance income excludes any benefits 
from DI (both from the original spell or any new spell). The variable that is instrumented (endogenous explanatory 
variable) is listed in the columns. The instrument itself is the treatment dummy (age as of August 1, 1993 less than 
45). Earnings and income are measured in thousands of euros per year. The replacement rate is expressed as a frac-
tion. Each regression is based on 84,185 observations. The following controls are used in the regressions: age in 
months as of August 1, 1993, [age−45] interacted with the treatment dummy, six dummies for degree of disability in 
1996, a cubic polynomial in pre-DI earnings, nine national origin dummies, a dummy for being married in 1996, 39 
regional dummies, a cubic polynomial in duration in DI at the start of the reform, a full set of interactions between 
the dummies for the degree of disability and the cubic polynomial in pre-DI earnings, a gender dummy, and a full set 
of interactions between all previously listed controls and gender. In total, each regression has 163 control variables.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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other social assistance programs increases by 7.8 percentage points. The estimates 
of panel B in Table 4 establish that benefit substitution is not only statistically sig-
nificant, but also important in economic terms.
Benefit substitution can occur mechanically when individuals automatically 
receive more income from other social assistance programs as their DI benefits 
decrease. While this might explain some of the substitution, it cannot account for 
the entire reaction, because we also observe individuals enrolling in other forms of 
social assistance for which enrollment is not automatic. Benefit substitution can also 
be a result of the individual actively searching for alternative sources of benefits and 
trying to qualify for them. Finally, benefit substitution can occur when caseworkers 
steer individuals toward alternative sources of support. We have no direct evidence 
on the relative importance of these three channels, but we suspect that all three may 
have contributed to the observed amount of benefit substitution to some degree.
The estimate in the first row in column 1 of panel C in Table 4 indicates that, for 
each euro of benefits decrease caused by the more stringent reexamination, the more 
stringent reexamination induced individuals to increase earnings by €0.62 in 1999. 
In other words, we find an earnings crowd-out ratio of 0.62: one euro of DI benefits 
crowds out €0.62 of earnings.22 Alternatively, one can scale the change in earnings 
by the change in total benefits (including DI benefits) due to the more stringent reex-
amination. For each euro in decreased DI benefits on the original spell, other benefits 
went up by €0.30 and DI benefits on new spells went up by €0.01. Therefore, total 
benefits only decreased by €0.69. Thus, per euro decrease in total benefits, earnings 
went up by €0.90 (= 0.62/0.69). The second row of panel C examines the extensive 
margin response and shows that, per €1,000 of disability benefits decrease caused 
by the more stringent reexamination, the probability of being employed in 1999 
increases by 2.9 percentage points. The second column presents analogous esti-
mates, but now scaled by the change in replacement rates caused by the more strin-
gent reexamination. We find that, for a  ten-percentage-point decrease in replacement 
rates, earnings increase by €1,085 per year (or about 19 percent) and the probability 
of employment increases by 5.1 percentage points. All four estimates in panel C 
are highly statistically significant and establish that the degree to which DI benefits 
crowd out labor market earnings and participation is economically meaningful.
In the late 1990s, the Netherlands experienced an economic boom, which likely 
made it relatively easy for individuals to increase their labor supply and reduced 
incentives to look for other forms of social assistance. As a result, our estimate for 
earnings crowd-out may be higher than it would have been during average economic 
times, while the estimate of benefit substitution may be lower. During the early 
2000s, the Netherlands experienced a recession, and, as we will see in Section IIIF 
below, our estimates of earnings crowd-out and benefit substitution remained simi-
lar during that period. A further reason why the earnings crowd-out estimate may 
be relatively high is that the Netherlands had various policies to foster reintegration 
into the labor market.
22 All amounts are gross of tax and social insurance contributions. Both benefits and earnings are subject to 
taxation and mandatory social insurance contributions, so we can directly compare changes in income to changes 
in benefits.
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DI recipients have an earnings exemption which equals their indexed previous 
earnings times the degree to which they were deemed able to work (i.e., one minus 
the degree of disability). Any earnings beyond the exemption faced a high implicit 
tax rate. Thus, if the reexamination led to a reduction in the disability rating, this 
both reduced the DI benefit (an income effect) and increased the earnings exemption 
(a substitution effect).23 Therefore, like most of the previous literature on the labor 
supply response to DI, we cannot determine the extent to which the response is 
driven by the substitution effect or by the income effect.24 However, given the large 
magnitude of the earnings reaction (especially if compared to the change in total 
benefits), we suspect that incentive effects stemming from the change in the earn-
ings exemption played a large role.
Panel D of Table 4 presents the combined effect of benefit substitution and earn-
ings crowd-out. The estimate in the first row and column indicates that individuals 
increased income from other social assistance (including new DI spells) and work 
by €0.92 per euro of original DI benefits lost. In other words, on average, individu-
als almost fully offset the decrease in DI benefits by increasing income from other 
sources, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the lost DI was completely offset 
( p-value 0.494). Even if the offset is complete, individuals now have to work more 
and are worse off to the extent they receive disutility from supplying labor.25 The 
second row shows the effect on a dummy for working or receiving income from a 
social assistance program other than the original DI spell. We find that per €1,000 
decrease in DI, an individual is 5.7 percentage points more likely to obtain income 
from a new source. The fact that this estimate is less than the sum of the estimates 
in row 2 of panels A, B, and C indicates that some individuals both started working 
and started drawing income from other forms of social assistance. In particular, per 
€1,000 decrease in DI, individuals became 1.7 (= 0.1 + 4.4 + 2.9 − 5.7) percent-
age points more likely to have both income from other social assistance programs 
and labor income in 1999.
The estimates in Table 4 are based on a piece-wise linear specification with 
a bandwidth of +/− 2.5 years around the cutoff age, which is the bandwidth 
suggested by applying the Imbens-Kalyanaraman criterion (2012) to our data. 
Online Appendix Table A6 explores the sensitivity of our key results to the choice 
23 Note, however, that there is no level of earnings at which DI benefits are increased by a reduction in the 
disability rating, whereas there is always some level of earnings at which DI benefits are strictly decreased by a 
reduction in the disability rating. Thus, despite the increase in the earnings exemption, a reduction in the disability 
rating implies a reduction in DI generosity.
24 Important exceptions are Campolieti and Riddell (2012), who show a labor supply response to the increase in 
the earnings exemption (a pure substitution effect), and Marie and Vall Castello (2012), who measure a labor supply 
response to a pure increase in DI benefits (an income effect).
25 Even if we cannot reject that individuals are, on average, able to fully offset the DI benefit cut, it is conceiv-
able that certain subgroups are not able to do so. To examine this possibility, online Appendix Table A5 compares 
current income to earnings (adjusted for general wage growth) prior to the start of the DI spell. To briefly sum-
marize our findings: we find that, on average, 65.9 percent of the sample had a lower income in 1999 than their 
earnings prior to DI. The RD estimate indicates that this fraction is a statistically significant 1.4 percentage points 
lower for those subject to the more stringent reexamination. Therefore, the more stringent reexamination slightly 
increased the fraction experiencing an income increase. On the other hand, 9.9 percent of the sample had an income 
in 1999 that was less than 50 percent of earnings prior to DI. This percentage is a statistically significant 1.6 per-
centage points higher for those subject to the more stringent reexamination. Hence, the effect of the more stringent 
reexamination on income changes is heterogeneous. It raises both the fraction experiencing increases in income and 
the fraction experiencing sharp drops in income.
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of bandwidth and to the choice of polynomial in the running variable. Overall, the 
table indicates that our qualitative results are reasonably robust to the choice of 
bandwidth and functional form for the running variable, though the point estimates 
do vary a fair amount across specifications.
D. Effects by Income Source, Gender, and Degree of Disability
The first column of panel A of Table 5 splits out the results of the first column 
of Table 4 by source of income. Of the increase in benefits, 67 percent came from 
increased UI benefits, 10 percent from increased General Assistance, 3 percent 
from reentry into DI, and 20 percent from all other types of social support benefits. 
The large increase in UI benefits was not automatic, but individuals did build up 
“work history” for the purpose of UI benefits while receiving DI (even if not work-
ing). We find that increased wage earnings account for 80 percent (= 0.492/0.618) 
of the earnings response, while changes in self-employment income account for 
20 percent. Given that evasion of wage earnings is hard and limited, this break-
down indicates that the earnings response is unlikely to be largely driven by people 
not changing their actual labor supply but simply starting to report their earnings. 
Panel B examines receipt of any amount by income sources, and its results are very 
similar to the results of panel A.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 split out the results of the first column by gender. 
These columns suggest that social support substitution is more predominant among 
women. In particular, the point estimate of the benefit-substitution ratio is much 
larger for women than for men (0.48 versus 0.26), but this difference is not statisti-
cally significant (p -value 0.149). However, the difference is statistically significant if 
we look at the participation response for other forms of social assistance. Per €1,000 
decrease in DI benefits, women increase their participation in other social assistance 
programs by 7.4 percentage points, which is nearly twice the 3.8-percentage-point 
increase by men. In response to a given DI benefit cut, women are also significantly 
more likely than men to start working, whereas the point estimate of the earnings 
response is actually slightly larger for men than for women (but this difference is not 
statistically significant). The fact that labor force participation is only 18 percent for 
women but 45 percent for men may explain why women experience a larger response 
on the extensive margin while total earnings increase slightly more for men because 
the scope for an intensive-margin response is larger among men. There is no signifi-
cant difference in the degree to which men and women are able to offset the decrease 
in DI benefits by other sources of income. We cannot determine what exactly drives 
differences in the effects on men and women, but we suspect that likely explanations 
are differences in initial DI benefit levels,  differences in types of disabilities, and 
differences in opportunities in the labor market and in household production.
Table 6 analyzes benefit substitution and earnings crowd-out by the degree of 
disability into which individuals were classified as of January 1, 1996 (before the 
 reexaminations took place).26 Panel A of Table 6 shows that the effects on benefits 
26 We also investigated whether the benefit-substitution ratio and the labor crowd-out ratio varied by marital 
status, previous earnings, duration of the DI spell, and national origin. We found no significant differences along 
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from new DI spells are small and do not vary significantly by gender or disability 
rating. Panel B shows that social support substitution is much more prevalent among 
individuals classified as fully disabled than among those classified as partially dis-
abled. This finding applies both for social assistance benefit amounts and for social 
assistance participation, and it holds in the entire sample as well as the subsamples 
by gender. These differences are not only statistically significant but also large in 
magnitude. The benefit-substitution ratio for the fully disabled is 0.49, which is four 
times as large as the ratio of 0.12 for partially disabled recipients. About 90 percent 
of this difference in benefit substitution ratios is accounted for by the larger increases 
in UI benefits among the fully disabled relative to partially disabled individuals.
In contrast, we find high rates of earnings crowd-out both for those classified 
as partially disabled and for those classified as fully disabled. Panel C shows that 
the point estimate of crowd-out is somewhat higher for the partially disabled than 
for the fully disabled (0.68 versus 0.52), but this difference is not statistically sig-
nificant. Perhaps the high degree to which the fully disabled are able to replace 
foregone disability income with earnings would not be surprising if the cut in dis-
ability income were minimal. This, however, is not the case. The more stringent 
reexamination caused a €799 (standard error: 86) reduction in benefits among the 
fully disabled. While this figure is only about half of the corresponding figure for 
the partially disabled (€1,678, standard error: 126), it is still a meaningful reduc-
tion in benefits. Moreover, about 30 percent of the fully disabled who experienced 
a benefit cut because of the more stringent reexamination became ineligible for DI. 
In short, given that the fully disabled experienced meaningful cuts in benefits, the 
high degree to which they were able to replace foregone disability income with labor 
income is quite striking. However, it should be kept in mind that the disability rating 
depended in part on the existence of sufficient suitable occupations in the applicant’s 
region, and that an applicant could be classified as fully disabled if this criterion was 
not met.
Panel D of Table 6 shows that, on average, both the partially and fully disabled 
are able to offset basically all of their lost DI income by other sources of income. 
The point estimates indicate that the fully disabled actually offset somewhat more of 
the lost DI benefits than the partially disabled, but this difference is not statistically 
significant.
these dimensions when we cut each dimension as closely as possible into two equally sized groups. See online 
Appendix Table A7 for details. If we cut duration into three groups of roughly equal size (longer than ten years, 
between four and ten years, and less than four years as of August 1, 1993), then we find that the labor supply 
response among those with durations shorter than four years is significantly larger than the labor supply response 
among those with durations between four and ten years. However, we continue to find a significant labor crowd-out 
ratio even for those who have been on DI for over ten years. We cannot stratify our estimates by medical diagnosis 
because much of this data was added retroactively and, consequently, is significantly less likely to be missing for 
those who remained on DI. However, we can in principle use those remaining on DI to infer differential exit by med-
ical diagnosis. The medical part of the reexamination was the same on either side of the age cutoff, which implies 
there should be no causal effect of the more stringent reexamination on the medical diagnosis itself. Therefore, any 
discontinuity at the age cutoff in the prevalence of a given medical diagnosis among those who remained on DI must 
be due to differential exit by that medical diagnosis. Unfortunately, we lack statistical precision on this inferred 
distribution of differential exit by medical diagnosis, as detailed in online Appendix Table A8.
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Table 5—Earnings Crowd-Out and Benefit Shifting by Source and by Gender 
Effect of reform per 1,000 €/year  
decrease in amount of original DI
Full sample Males Females
p-value  
gender dif.
Panel A. Amounts in 1999
Total other social assistance, of which: 0.305
(0.047)***
0.261
(0.047)***
0.482
(0.146)***
0.149
 Unemployment insurance 0.203
(0.020)***
0.187
(0.021)***
0.266
(0.051)***
 General assistance 0.030
(0.007)***
0.032
(0.007)***
0.024
(0.024)
 Reentry into DI 0.008
(0.008) −0.001(0.009)
0.046
(0.025)*
 All other benefits 0.063
(0.041)
0.043
(0.040)
0.146
(0.129)
Total earnings, of which: 0.618
(0.108)***
0.632
(0.124)***
0.564
(0.208)***
0.781
 Wage earnings 0.492
(0.098)***
0.497
(0.114)***
0.471
(0.181)***
 Self-employment earning 0.126(0.061)**
0.135
(0.070)*
0.093
(0.113)
Total income from other income sources 0.923
(0.113)***
0.892
(0.127)***
1.046
(0.250)***
0.582
Panel B. Participation in 1999
Any income from other social assistance 0.045
(0.005)***
0.038
(0.005)***
0.074
(0.016)***
0.037
 Any unemployment insurance 0.034
(0.003)***
0.030
(0.003)***
0.050
(0.009)***
 Any general assistance 0.009
(0.002)***
0.010
(0.002)***
0.007
(0.006)
 Reentry into DI 0.001
(0.001)**
0.001
(0.001)*
0.003
(0.002)
 Any other benefits 0.015
(0.004)***
0.010
(0.004)**
0.035
(0.013)***
Any work 0.029
(0.005)***
0.023
(0.005)***
0.053
(0.013)***
0.026
 Any wage income 0.024
(0.005)***
0.018
(0.005)***
0.050
(0.012)***
 Any self-employment income 0.006(0.003)**
0.007
(0.003)** −0.001(0.005)
Any other income source 0.057
(0.006)***
0.044
(0.006)***
0.105
(0.019)***
0.002
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each entry in the table comes from a separate IV regression based on the 
fuzzy RD design. The dependent variable is listed in the rows. Income and earnings are measured in thousands of 
euros per year. “Other income sources” excludes DI income from the original spell. General assistance provides an 
income floor for everyone and does not require having dependents. Any other benefits are benefits from a large num-
ber of smaller (about 30) benefit programs. The variable that is instrumented (endogenous explanatory variable) is 
the amount of DI, so all coefficients can be interpreted as effect size per €1,000/year decrease in DI. The instrument 
itself is the treatment dummy (age less than 45 as of August 1, 1993). The regressions are based on 84,185; 55,772; 
and 28,413 observations for the full sample, males, and females, respectively. See the note to Table 4 for the demo-
graphic controls included in the regression.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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E. responses of Partners of DI recipients and Total Budgetary Impacts
In Table 7 we provide estimates of benefit substitution and earnings crowd-out at 
the household level. These estimates differ from our baseline estimates of Table 4 
in that the current estimates account for possible responses of partners of (former) 
Table 6—Earnings Crowd-Out and Benefit Shifting by Degree of Disability and Gender
Effect of reform per 1,000 €/year  
decrease in amount of original DI
Full sample Males Females
p-value gender 
difference
Panel A. New DI benefit in 1999
Income from a new DI spell
 Partially disabled in 1996 0.005
(0.008)
0.001
(0.008)
0.021
(0.025)
0.457
 Fully disabled in 1996 0.010
(0.015) −0.005(0.015)
0.063
(0.042)
0.124
 p-value on difference by disability 0.770 0.694 0.388
Participation dummy
 Partially disabled in 1996 0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
0.971
 Fully disabled in 1996 0.002
(0.001)*
0.001
(0.001)
0.005
(0.003)
0.235
 p-value on difference by disability 0.419 0.954 0.283
Panel B. other social assistance in 1999
Income from other social assistance
 Partially disabled in 1996 0.117
(0.047)**
0.123
(0.049)**
0.091
(0.141)
0.833
 Fully disabled in 1996 0.491
(0.086)***
0.421
(0.084)***
0.740
(0.263)***
0.247
 p-value on difference by disability <0.001 0.002 0.029
Participation dummy
 Partially disabled in 1996 0.015
(0.006)***
0.015
(0.006)***
0.012
(0.015)
0.853
 Fully disabled in 1996 0.076
(0.010)***
0.061
(0.009)***
0.128
(0.035)***
0.064
 p-value on difference by disability <0.001 <0.001 0.002
Panel c. Labor market outcomes in 1999
Earnings
 Partially disabled in 1996 0.682
(0.166)***
0.732
(0.186)***
0.435
(0.357)
0.460
 Fully disabled in 1996 0.520
(0.128)***
0.506
(0.148)***
0.572
(0.250)**
0.819
 p-value on difference by disability 0.441 0.341 0.753
Employment dummy
 Partially disabled in 1996 0.023
(0.006)***
0.020
(0.006)***
0.037
(0.017)**
0.357
 Fully disabled in 1996 0.034
(0.008)***
0.026
(0.009)***
0.062
(0.019)***
0.087
 p-value on difference by disability 0.246 0.555 0.333
(continued )
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DI recipients. We find that our point estimates of benefit substitution in the entire 
sample are virtually identical whether or not we take the partners’ responses into 
account. For men the benefit-substitution ratio becomes somewhat larger, while for 
women it becomes smaller, but neither difference is statistically significant. Though 
the increase in earnings crowd-out of 18 percentage points is not insubstantial in 
economic terms, it is statistically insignificant. Earnings responses of partners were 
previously studied by Cullen and Gruber (2000), who estimate that increased UI 
benefits paid to unemployed males are largely offset by their wives’ decreased labor 
market earnings, as well as by Duggan, Rosenheck, and Singleton (2010), who 
exploit a policy change to show that an increase in disability benefits for Vietnam-era 
veterans caused a reduction in their spouses’ labor supply. While partner responses 
could potentially be significant, and therefore are important to consider, we find that 
they play only a limited role in our setting. However, including the partner responses 
does decrease the precision of our estimates, which is why we exclude them from 
our other analyses.
The Dutch tax system makes no distinction between labor income and income 
from social assistance programs, and the effective marginal tax rate is roughly con-
stant at a rate of approximately 40 percent. This implies that a €1,000 reduction in 
Effect of reform per 1,000 €/year  
decrease in amount of original DI
Full sample Males Females
p-value gender 
difference
Panel D. Total
Income except from original DI spell
 Partially disabled in 1996 0.804
(0.163)***
0.856
(0.182)***
0.547
(0.360)
0.444
 Fully disabled in 1996 1.021
(0.153)***
0.921
(0.166)***
1.376
(0.392)***
0.285
 p -value on difference by disability 0.332 0.793 0.119
Dummy for work or other soc. asst.
 Partially disabled in 1996 0.030
(0.005)***
0.028
(0.005)***
0.036
(0.017)**
0.656
 Fully disabled in 1996 0.084
(0.011)***
0.062
(0.011)***
0.163
(0.041)***
0.017
 p -value on difference by disability <0.001 0.005 0.004
Observations:
 Partially disabled in 1996 28,509 22,590 5,919
 Fully disabled in 1996 55,676 33,182 22,494
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each entry in the table comes from a separate IV regression based on 
the fuzzy RD design. The dependent variable is listed in the rows. Income and earnings are measured in thousands 
of euros per year. The variable that is instrumented (endogenous explanatory variable) is the amount of DI, so all 
coefficients can be interpreted as effect size per €1,000/year decrease in DI. The instrument itself is the treatment 
dummy (age less than 45 as of August 1, 1993). Degree of disability is as determined by the disability administra-
tion (see text for the description of the procedure for the determination of degree of disability). See the note to Table 
4 for the demographic controls included in the regression.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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DI benefits reduces government expenditures by about €600, net of taxes. According 
to the estimates in the first column of Table 7, a €1,000 reduction in DI benefits 
leads to increased expenditure on other social assistance programs  (including 
 reentry into DI) by €302 (= €294 + €8), which comes at a cost of 0.60 × 302 
= €181, net of taxes. Table 7 also shows that a €1,000 reduction in DI benefits 
increases earnings by €795, which generates additional tax revenue of 0.40 × 795 
= €318. Thus, the additional tax revenue from the labor supply response more than 
offsets the additional costs from social support substitution. Consequently, for each 
€1,000 (net €600) reduction in DI benefits, government spending decreases by 
600 + 318 − 181 = €737. Thus, the combined effect of the labor supply response 
and social support substitution increases government savings from the reduction in 
DI benefits by 23 percent (= (737− 600)/600).
F. responses over Time
Responses to reductions in DI benefits could vary over time for a variety of 
reasons, including time limits on certain forms of social assistance and the search 
time required to find a suitable match in the labor market. Hence, focusing only 
on 1999 (about two years after the reexaminations for the relevant cohorts) yields 
an  incomplete picture of the consequences of the reform. Another concern is that 
much of the decline in DI benefits for the under-45 cohort might be undone over 
Table 7—Earnings Crowd-Out and Benefit Shifting Including Partner Responses 
Effect of reform per 1,000 €/year  
decrease in amount of original DI
Full sample Males Females
p -value  
gender difference
Panel A. New DI benefit in 1999
 Income from a new DI spell 0.008
(0.008)
0.001
(0.008)
0.046
(0.025)*
0.074
Panel B. other social assistance in 1999
 Income from other social assistance 0.294
(0.082)***
0.308
(0.065)***
0.238
(0.317)
0.830
Panel c. Labor market outcomes in 1999
 Earnings 0.795
(0.209)***
0.718
(0.182)***
1.102
(0.749)
0.619
Panel D. Total
 Income except from original DI spell 1.097
(0.204)***
1.025
(0.185)***
1.386
(0.705)**
0.620
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each entry in the table comes from a separate IV regression based on 
the fuzzy RD design. The dependent variable is listed in the rows. Income and earnings are measured in thousands 
of euros per year. The variable that is instrumented (endogenous explanatory variable) is the amount of DI, so all 
coefficients can be interpreted as effect size per €1,000/year decrease in DI. The instrument itself is the treatment 
dummy (age less than 45 as of August 1, 1993). The regressions are based on 84,185 observations for the full sam-
ple, and on 55,772 and 28,413 observations for males and females, respectively. See the note to Table 4 for the 
demographic controls included in the regression.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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time through “promotions” in the disability rating. We therefore repeated our main 
analyses for all years in our dataset.27
Panel A of Figure 6 presents estimates of the reduced-form RD regression of DI 
benefit amounts for each of the years from 1999 to 2005. This panel shows that the 
effect of the more stringent reexamination on DI benefit amounts is remarkably con-
stant over time.28 Panel B shows estimates of the benefit-substitution ratio and the 
earnings crowd-out ratio over time. We find that both the earnings crowd-out ratio 
and benefit-substitution ratio are positive and statistically significant in each year 
27 Additional DI reforms took place in 2002 and 2004. The first reform only affected new entrants, while the 
second reform led to a reexamination of people on DI who were younger than 50 on July 1, 2004. All individu-
als in our sample were older than 50 at that time. Thus, these reforms do not affect the individuals in our sample. 
However, the major overhaul of the DI system in 2006 did affect the individuals in our sample, which is why we 
end our sample period in 2005.
28 We find a similar persistence of the effect of the more stringent reexamination when we examine the impact 
on disability ratings rather than the impact on benefit amounts. In online Appendix Table A9, we repeat the analysis 
of Table 3, but now for the years 1996 to 2005 (rather than 1996 to 1999, as in Table 3).
Panel A. Effect of more stringent reexamination on DI benefits in €1,000/year 
(first stage)
Panel B. Earnings crowd-out and benefit shifting using the 1999 first stage 
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except 2003, when the benefit-substitution ratio is only marginally statistically sig-
nificant. The degree to which individuals replace lost DI benefits with other forms 
of social assistance decreases over time, from 30 percent in 1999 to 14 percent in 
2005. This decrease is statistically significant and is driven by the decreased reliance 
on UI benefits over time. Whereas UI benefits account for 20 percentage points of 
the benefit-substitution ratio in 1999, they only account for 5 percentage points in 
2005. This decline is consistent with the fact that unemployment assistance is only 
available for a limited duration. This decline is partly offset by increased reliance 
on new DI spells. Income from new DI spells makes up for about 1 percent of lost 
DI benefits in 1999, but 6 percent of lost DI benefits in 2005. Reliance on General 
Assistance and other forms of social assistance remains roughly constant over time. 
The figure shows a slight increase over time in the earnings crowd-out ratio, which 
rises from 62 percent in 1999 to 71 percent in 2005, but this increase is not statisti-
cally significant. The fraction of earnings that comes from self-employment remains 
roughly constant over time.
IV.  Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the consequences of a reduction in the generosity of 
one social support program when that program is part of a larger system of social 
assistance programs. Especially in the case of social assistance for people in their 
prime age, there is relatively little evidence on the extent to which reduced gener-
osity of one program induces increased labor supply, and to what extent it leads to 
more reliance on other social assistance programs instead. Examining the labor sup-
ply response of existing beneficiaries (as opposed to labor supply responses to qual-
ify for a program) is important for policy because a response by the large stock of 
existing beneficiaries can quickly affect DI participation rates, whereas a response 
by new enrollees will only slowly affect overall DI participation. Showing a labor 
supply response of long-term DI beneficiaries (including individuals who are clas-
sified as fully disabled) also establishes that long-term participation in DI does not 
severely degrade one’s labor market skills. Benefit substitution is of obvious policy 
relevance in many countries. While most existing studies have investigated spillover 
effects among programs for children or for people close to retirement, this paper 
examines benefit-substitution and earnings crowd-out effects for people on DI in 
their late forties. Finally, our paper recognizes that spillovers can be partly driven by 
responses from partners of people affected by the reform and that the spillovers may 
vary with the amount of time passed since the reform.
The combination of access to extensive administrative panel data and the pres-
ence of a cohort discontinuity in a reform law allows us to produce causal estimates 
of the effect of reduced DI generosity on participation in other social assistance 
programs. We find economically meaningful and statistically significant evidence 
of social support substitution. About two years after the implementation of the DI 
reform for our sample members, income drawn from other social assistance pro-
grams increases by €0.30 for each euro of reduced DI benefits. At 49 percent, the 
benefit substitution effect is especially pronounced for the fully disabled, whereas it 
is just 12 percent for partially disabled DI recipients. The benefit-substitution ratio 
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decreases over time and reaches 14 percent about eight years after implementation 
of the reform for our sample.
We also find a remarkable earnings rebound, given that all members of our sam-
ple were at least partially disabled and had, on average, been receiving DI for over a 
decade when the reform was implemented for our cohorts. On average, individuals 
were able to make up 62 percent of their foregone DI benefits through increased 
earnings, and this figure is similar for partially and fully disabled individuals. 
Between increased income from labor and other social assistance programs, indi-
viduals almost fully offset the decrease in DI benefits. Of course, these estimates are 
based on a relatively minor (10 percent on average) cut in DI benefits, and may not 
apply for larger cuts. Furthermore, because these estimates reveal average responses, 
they can also mask more severe impacts on total income for certain subgroups of DI 
recipients.
Benefit-substitution and earnings crowd-out estimates would obviously be differ-
ent in different settings, but the direction in which the estimates would change is not 
clear. Our benefit-substitution figure may be higher than it would be in other coun-
tries, as the Netherlands has a relatively generous system of alternative social assis-
tance programs. On the other hand, the reform we analyzed concerned a relatively 
minor reduction in DI generosity. Thus, many of those affected by the reform may 
not have qualified for means-tested alternative forms of social assistance. Moreover, 
alternative forms of social assistance may still have been less attractive than DI 
(despite the reduction in DI generosity).
While our specific coefficient estimates only directly apply to this particular 
Dutch DI reform, we believe our paper offers three general lessons that are widely 
applicable. First, our paper provides strong evidence that spillover effects between 
social assistance programs can be substantial, also for prime-aged individuals. Thus, 
any analysis of reforms of social assistance programs would be well advised to con-
sider the possibility of benefit substitution. Second, we show that, among long-term 
disability recipients, there may still be a substantial capacity to change labor income 
in response to relatively moderate changes in DI generosity. In other words, labor 
supply among DI recipients is not just determined by limitations from disability, but 
also by economic incentives. Finally, our work emphasizes that it could be impor-
tant in some cases to take into account the responses of the partners of the individu-
als directly affected by the reform and to consider the amount of benefit substitution 
and earnings crowd-out over the longer term.
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